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Abstract 
 
This article examines the impact of the divergence between corporate insiders’ control rights and cash-
flow rights on firms’ external finance constraints via generalized method of moments estimation of an 
investment Euler equation.  Using a large sample of U.S. firms during the 1994–2002 period, we find that 
the shadow value of external funds is significantly higher for companies with a wider insider control-
ownership divergence, suggesting that companies whose corporate insiders have larger excess control 
rights are more financially constrained.  The effect of insider excess control rights on external finance 
constraints is more pronounced for firms with higher degrees of informational opacity and for firms with 
financial misreporting, and is moderated by institutional ownership.  The results show that the agency 
problems associated with the control-ownership divergence can have a real impact on corporate financial 
and investment outcomes.   
 
JEL Classifications:  G31; G32; G34 
 
Keywords:  Ownership structure; Insider excess control rights; Financial constraints. 
                                                            
* We are grateful to Ben Esty, Stuart Gilson, Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, Bill Schwert (the editor), Andrei 
Shleifer, Jeremy Stein, Belen Villalonga, and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions and comments.  Lin and 
Xuan acknowledge financial support from the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Division of Research of the 
Harvard Business School, respectively. 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1590748
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
Recent research in corporate ownership and control has documented a divergence 
between the control rights and cash-flow rights of corporate insiders in many publicly traded 
firms around the world (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999).  Corporate officers and directors often have 
voting rights substantially in excess of their cash-flow rights, and in many cases, have effective 
control over all corporate decisions with disproportionately small economic interest in the firm 
(Gompers et al., 2010).  In such firms, the classic agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is exacerbated to a conflict between corporate insiders 
and outside investors since the corporate insiders have the incentives and ability to divert 
corporate resources for private benefits at the expense of other investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Djankov et al., 2008).  In line with this view, numerous studies have shown a negative 
relationship between the control rights-cash-flow rights deviation and corporate valuation in 
various countries and settings.1  
While previous studies have tackled the question of whether the divergence between 
control rights and cash-flow rights (the “control-ownership divergence”) affects corporate values, 
the specific channels behind this relationship are largely unknown.  Intuitively, it seems quite 
implausible that the large valuation discounts noted in the literature in firms with separation of 
ownership and control are solely driven by direct expropriation activities.  In this paper, we 
identify an important mechanism through which the insider control-ownership divergence may 
affect firm values, and show that insider ownership structure has a real impact on corporate 
financial and investment outcomes.  Specifically, using generalized method of moments 
estimation of an investment Euler equation proposed by Whited and Wu (2006), we examine the 
impact of the excess control rights of corporate insiders on firms’ external finance constraints.  
External finance is a particularly important channel to investigate because financial constraints 
                                                            
1 Gompers et al. (2010) provide a recent review of this literature. 
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prevent firms from funding all desired investment (Stein, 2003; Billett et al., 2011).  As a result, 
financially constrained firms might be forced to forgo significant investment projects with 
positive net present values.  In fact, Whited and Wu (2006) find that the most financially 
constrained firms (by quartile) invest 18% less than the least constrained ones. 
Corporate finance theories provide a straightforward motivation for the connection 
between corporate insiders’ control-ownership divergence and firms’ financing constraints.  In 
pursuit of private benefits, corporate insiders and controlling shareholders may seek to 
expropriate other investors, including minority shareholders and creditors, through various self-
dealing activities including outright theft, transfer pricing, investor dilution, executive perquisite, 
expropriation of corporate opportunities, investment in unprofitable projects for self-interest, 
asset sales to insiders or affiliated corporations at favorable prices, loan guarantees using the 
firm’s assets as collateral, and other self-serving financial transactions (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; La Porta et al., 2000; Johnson, et al., 2000a; Djankov et al., 2008).  The “private benefits 
of control” are reflected by the widely documented premium at which shares with superior 
voting rights trade (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Relevant evidence has been shown not only in 
developing countries where investor protection might be poor, but also in many developed 
countries including the U.S.2   In extreme cases, as pointed out by Friedman et al. (2003), many 
bankruptcy cases in both developing and developed countries have been associated with 
complete looting by corporate insiders and controlling shareholders, leaving the minority 
shareholders and creditors almost nothing when the firms went bankrupt.  Corporate insiders’ 
incentives to engage in self-dealing activities are especially strong when they have control rights 
in excess of cash-flow rights, as the excess control rights afford them the ability to do so while 
bearing a relatively small proportion of the financial consequence (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Johnson et al., 2000a).  Masulis et al. (2009) find evidence that insiders with excess control 
rights waste corporate resources at the expense of shareholders in the pursuit of private benefits.  
                                                            
2 The evidence has been shown in various contexts including the U.S. savings and loan crisis (Akerlof and 
Romer, 1993), the Mexican and Asian financial crises (La Porta et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2000b), and legal 
disputes over self-dealing in France, Italy, Belgium, and Germany (Johnson et al., 2000a).   
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Moreover, in effect, the insider control-ownership divergence often creates an extreme example 
of antitakeover protection (Gompers et al., 2010).  The problem of expropriation by insiders is 
aggravated in such firms without valid takeover threats, as corporate insiders with large control 
rights get entrenched and managerial discretion cannot be effectively controlled (Jensen, 1993; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).   
In anticipation of the potential expropriation by corporate insiders in firms with a 
divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights, outside investors (both shareholders and 
creditors) are less willing to invest in these firms because they face the risk that the returns on 
their investment will never materialize (La Porta et al., 2000).  As a direct consequence, such 
firms become financially more constrained due to the very costly or even lack of access to 
external finance.  Despite the theoretical appeal, to the best of our knowledge, no study has 
examined the link between the control-ownership divergence and external financing constraints.  
In this paper, we fill this gap by examining the relationship between the control-
ownership divergence of a firm’s corporate insiders and the firm’s external finance constraints 
using a newly available data set on insider ownership structure of U.S. firms over the period 
1994 to 2002.  Following Whited and Wu (2006), we take a structural approach and explore this 
relationship by estimating the Euler equation of a standard intertemporal investment model 
augmented to account for financial constraints.  Indeed, Whited (1992) shows that the 
augmentations of the investment equation improve its fit.  The basic idea is that finance 
constraints affect the intertemporal substitution of investment today for investment tomorrow 
through the shadow value of external funds.  Intuitively, firms that are financially constrained 
have investment growth that is too high given their current profitability because they put off 
projects with positive net present values into the future; that is, they behave as if they have a high 
discount rate.  Therefore, investment today is too low relative to investment tomorrow.  The 
shadow value of external funds can be parameterized as a function of observable firm and 
industry characteristics, and the parameters can be estimated via generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimation.  The fitted value of the shadow value will be a measure of external finance 
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constraints (Whited and Wu, 2006).  By modifying the specification for the shadow value to 
include insider ownership structure, we can test whether the insider control-ownership 
divergence affects financial constraints by examining the relevant parameter estimate as well as 
the overall model suitability. 
The structural approach employed in the paper has significant advantages over the 
alternative test for financial constraints based on reduced-form regressions of investment on 
Tobin’s q and cash flow in which the investment-cash flow sensitivity from the regression results 
is interpreted as a measure of financial constraints (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988).  If investment 
opportunities are measured with error, the positive link between investment and cash flow in 
such regressions may arise not because of financial constraints, but merely because cash flow 
captures the quality of investment opportunities.  Indeed, Tobin’s q contains a great deal of 
measurement error as a proxy for investment opportunities (Erickson and Whited, 2000). 3   
Furthermore, from a theoretical standpoint, using investment-cash flow sensitivity to proxy for 
financial constraints has also been demonstrated to be flawed, as curvature in the profit function 
can result in a discrepancy between marginal and average q, which gives cash flow independent 
predictive power in investment regressions even if financing is frictionless (e.g., Hennessy and 
Whited, 2007).  In contrast, as Whited and Wu (2006) point out, the most significant advantage 
of the investment Euler equation approach is its avoidance, via structural estimation, of serious 
estimation problems that plague reduced-form regressions including simultaneity and 
measurement errors.  We therefore opt for this approach in our analysis of the relationship 
between insider ownership structure and external finance constraints. 
Our results indicate that the shadow value of external funds is significantly higher at 
companies with a wider divergence between corporate insiders’ control rights and cash-flow 
rights.  The coefficients on various measures of insider ownership structure are all positive and 
highly statistically significant, indicating that companies whose corporate insiders have larger 
                                                            
3  The structural approach based on the investment Euler equation has an advantage of avoiding the 
measurement error problem because it does not require the measure of marginal q in estimation. 
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excess control rights are more financially constrained.  Moreover, the model specification tests 
of the overidentifying restrictions imply that models including measures of insider ownership 
structure are not misspecified.  The effect of insider ownership structure on financing constraints 
remains strong and significant after controlling for a series of firm characteristics shown in the 
existing literature that affect firm financial constraints.  Our results suggest that insider 
ownership structure is an important factor that influences external finance constraints, and the 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that the excess control rights of a firm’s corporate 
insiders increase the likelihood of insider expropriation of other investors and therefore intensify 
the firm’s external financial constraints.   
We then investigate the factors that influence the relationship between insider ownership 
structure and external finance constraints.  Our goal is to understand in what situations the 
divergence between insider control rights and cash-flow rights most severely affects financial 
constraints and to shed light on how such effects might be mitigated.  We examine the following 
set of factors: firm informational opacity, financial restatement and misreporting, and 
institutional ownership.  To implement the empirical estimation, we include these factors and 
their interactions with the measure for insider ownership structure in the specification for the 
shadow value of external funds and re-estimate the Euler equation.  If the effect of insider 
ownership structure on external finance constraints is driven by potential expropriation risk, we 
should expect to see a more pronounced effect in situations where insiders with excess control 
rights are more likely to engage in self-dealing or expropriation activities. 
The results from these estimations indicate that the effect of the insider control-ownership 
divergence on financial constraints is more pronounced for firms with higher degrees of 
informational opacity.  Specifically, it is particularly strong for small firms, firms without debt 
ratings, firms that are not included in the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 stock index, and firms 
with relatively meager analyst coverage.  The effect is also greater for firms with financial 
restatements, especially for those involved in fraudulent misreporting.  Finally, we find that the 
shadow value of external funds is significantly and negatively associated with firms’ institutional 
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ownership. More interestingly, we find that institutional ownership weakens the relationship 
between the insider control-ownership divergence and external finance constraints, indicating the 
monitoring role of institutional investors on potential expropriation activities of corporate 
insiders.   
Taken together, our results suggest that the divergence between insider control rights and 
cash-flow rights aggravates the risks of potential expropriation of outside shareholders and 
creditors by a firm’s corporate insiders and thereby increases the firm’s external finance 
constraints.  We find such evidence of finance constraints by examining observed real 
investment decisions.  Therefore, we report real effects of the agency problems associated with 
the control-ownership divergence and show that ownership structure can have a real impact on 
corporate financial and investment outcomes.  This paper contributes to a number of related 
literatures.  First, the paper adds to the classical yet growing literature on ownership and control 
(e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Gompers et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2011) by 
linking insider excess control rights to external finance constraints.  This sheds direct light on the 
valuation discount shown in the literature by demonstrating the mechanism through which the 
control-ownership divergence may affect firm values.  More specifically, the observed valuation 
losses in firms with divergent control and cash-flow rights are not just from their difficulty in 
obtaining external finance, but also from the distorted real investment decisions brought about by 
these finance constraints.  These results also contribute to the literature on self-dealing and 
expropriation (e.g., Johnson et al., 2000a; La Porta et al., 2000; Djankov et al., 2008) by showing 
the real corporate outcomes caused by insiders’ potential expropriation and self-dealing activities.  
Last but not least, our paper adds to the literature on financial constraints (e.g., Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997, and Whited and Wu, 2006)4 and shows that ownership structure is an important 
determinant of financial constraints.   
                                                            
4 Stein (2003) provides a comprehensive review of this literature. 
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     The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes the specification 
and estimation methodology for the structural model of investment and external financial 
constraints.  Section 3 discusses the data and variables and presents summary statistics.  Section 
4 presents the empirical results.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Model specification and estimation methodology 
 
In this section, we briefly outline the specification and estimation methodology for the 
structural model of investment and external finance constraints.  Following the pioneering work 
of Whited (1992), we adopt the Euler equation approach to estimate the extent of financing 
constraints.  This structural model approach is based on the dynamic optimization theory of the 
investment Euler equation.  As discussed in the introduction, the structural approach to estimate 
financial constraints has significant advantages over the alternative investment-cash flow 
sensitivity estimation from reduced-form regressions as it avoids serious sample selection, 
simultaneity, and measurement-error problems.  This section closely follows Whited (1992) and 
Whited and Wu (2006), which provide more detailed derivations and discussions.   
Suppose firm i maximizes the following objective function (given by Eq. (1)), subject to 
the dividend identity (Eq. (2)) and the dynamic investment constraints (Eq. (3)): 
0 0 0,
0
maxi i t it
t
W E D

                (1) 
subject to 
, 1( , ) ( , ) (1 )it it it it it it i t t itD K v C I K I B r B             (2) 
itiitti KIK )1(1,  .         (3) 
In Eq. (1), Wi0 is the present-value of firm i at time 0; Ei0 is the expectation operator conditional 
on firm i’s information set at time 0; 0,t is the discount factor from time 0 to t; and Dit is firm i’s 
dividends at time t.  In Eq. (2), ( , )it itK v  is the restricted profit function that is maximized with 
respect to variable costs, with Kit denoting firm i’s capital stock at time t and vit denoting the 
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productivity shock; ),( itit KIC  is the adjustment cost of investment, with Iit denoting firm i’s 
investment at time t; Bit and rt are firm i’s stock of debt and its coupon rate at time t, respectively.  
In Eq. (3), i is firm i’s depreciation rate of the capital stock. 
The financial frictions are introduced via a constraint on dividends in Eq. (4) below: 
* ,it itD D            (4) 
where *itD  is the lower bound on dividends of the firm.
5 
The estimation hinges on the identification of the Lagrange multiplier on the dividends 
constraint, denoted as it, via the Euler equation governing the capital stock.  This multiplier is 
equal to the shadow value of scarce external funds, or the shadow cost associated with raising 
new external equity financing.  Hence, a higher value of it indicates a higher cost of external 
financing.  The shadow cost of external finance is zero, which implies it = 0, if the external 
financing constraint is not binding. 
The Euler equation is obtained from the first-order condition with respect to investment 
expenditure: 
, 1 . 1
, 1 , 1 , 1
(1 ) 1 1,it t t i t i
i t i t i t it
C C CE Λ
K K I I
  
  
                           
    (5) 
where 
itI
C

  is the marginal adjustment cost of investment, 
, 1 , 1i t i t
C
K K

 
    is the marginal “net 
profit” of capital, and 
it
i.t
i.t λ
λΛ 
  1
1 1
1 , which is the relative shadow cost of external finance.  
The Euler Eq. (5) indicates that the marginal adjustment and purchasing costs of 
investing today (on the right-hand side) should be equal to the discounted marginal cost of 
postponing investment to tomorrow (on the left-hand side).  In other words, the optimal 
                                                            
5 Whited (1992) and Whited and Wu (2006) include one more external finance constraint, namely the upper 
bound on the stock of debt, but they point out that since it is difficult to separate the identification of the Lagrange 
multipliers on the dividends constraint and on the debt constraint, they only focus on the identification of the 
Lagrange multiplier on the dividends constraint in their estimation.  
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investment decision of a firm should be made such that, on the margin, it must be indifferent 
between investing today and waiting and transferring those resources to invest tomorrow. 
To estimate the Euler Eq. (5), Whited and Wu (2006) make the following assumptions on 
the marginal restricted profit of capital (defined by Eq. (6)) and on the real adjustment cost of 
investment (defined by Eq. (7)): 
it it
it it
Y C
K K
             (6) 
3
0
2
( , ) .
m
m it
it it it
m it
IC I K K
m K


         

 
      (7) 
In the above equations, Yit and Cit are firm i’s output and variable costs at time t, respectively;  
is a constant mark-up; and m (m=2, 3) are parameters to be estimated.6 
 Using Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) and replacing the expectations operator with an expectational 
error, i,t+1, which is uncorrelated with any information known at time t, we can rewrite Eq. (5) as:  
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, 1
2
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m
it
m i t i t
m it
I
K
   



                (8) 
where we also added an unobserved firm fixed effect (i) and a time fixed effect (t) to capture 
the macroeconomic business cycle. 
Eq. (8) is the estimating equation that can be estimated with specifications from Whited 
and Wu (2006) for the stochastic discount factor (t,t+1) and for the unobservable shadow cost of 
external finance (i,t+1).  
The stochastic discount factor is specified by the three-factor Fama and French (1993) 
model: 
                                                            
6 Following Whited and Wu (2006), we set the highest power at m=3. 
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t,t+1 = 0 +1 MKTt+1 +2 SMBt+1 +3 HMLt+1,      (9) 
where i is a parameter, MKT is the return on the market portfolio, SMB is the return on a 
portfolio that is long small firms and short large firms, and HML is the return on a portfolio that 
is long high book-to-market firms and short low book-to-market firms. 
As for the specification for the shadow cost, i,t+1, we start with a parameterization 
consisting of nine firm- and industry-level financial variables specified in Whited and Wu (2006) 
and a measure for the insider ownership structure as an additional parameter: 
i,t+1 = 0 +1(industry sales growth)i,t+1 +2(firm sales growth)i,t+1+3log(assets)i,t+1  
         +4(cash flow/assets)i,t+1 +5(industry debt/assets)i,t+1  
             +6(long-term debt/assets)i,t+1 +7(liquid assets/total assets)i,t+1  
         + 8(cash dividend dummy)i,t+1 + 9(number of analysts following the firm)i,t+1       
        +10(insider control-ownership divergence measure)i,t+1,       (10) 
where i is a parameter to be estimated. 
We apply the nonlinear GMM estimator to Eq. (8) in its first differences to eliminate 
possible fixed firm effects.7  Following Whited and Wu (2006), we conduct the Holtz-Eakin 
(1988) test to test for the presence of firm fixed effects.  The test strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis (at the 1% significance level) that a non-differenced specification is correct.   
Our instruments include all the variables in the Euler equation, as well as inventories, 
depreciation, current assets, current liabilities, the net value of capital stock, and tax payments, as 
suggested by Whited and Wu (2006).8  All of these instruments are normalized by total assets 
and lagged two periods in the GMM estimation.       
                                                            
7 Additional instruments include three good predictors of profitability (Fama and French, 2000; Whited and 
Wu, 2006).  They are the ratio of dividends to total assets, the average profitability over the previous three years, and 
a dummy if the net profit was positive in time t-1.  We include year dummies in our estimation.  Following Whited 
and Wu (2006), we impose two constraints on our GMM estimation.  First, the expected value of the stochastic 
discount factor must equal 1/(1+rf), where rf is the risk-free rate.  Second, the expectation of the shadow cost must 
be nonnegative. 
 
8 We conduct F-tests to verify instrument strength, and the F-statistics confirm the relevance of these 
instruments. 
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Finally, to illustrate more intuitively how investment Euler equations work and how 
finance constraints operate in this setting, we present a simplified linear version of the Euler 
equation to explain its main mechanism.  An Euler equation in a frictionless setting can be 
approximately expressed as follows (e.g., Bond and Meghir, 1994): 
Investmentit    1Investmenti,t+1 + 2(Marginal product of capital)i,t+1 + εi,t+1.  (11)  
Therefore, Euler equations are roughly the first differences of investment-q regressions, as the 
marginal product of capital is approximately the difference between q and lagged q.  Euler 
equations are thus very similar to the standard investment-q regressions, but the Euler equation 
approach does not require measurement of the unobservable q, which is an appealing feature.  In 
such a setting, a constrained firm invests too little today relative to tomorrow, given the 
realization of the marginal product of capital: 
Investmentit  <  1Investmenti,t+1 + 2(Marginal product of capital)i,t+1 + εi,t+1.  (12)  
In this case, adding financial variables is roughly equivalent to adding interaction terms that 
downweight one side of the investment Euler equation via the relative shadow cost of external 
finance. 
 
3. Data 
 
3.1. Sample construction 
 
We construct our sample from all firms included in the Compustat Industrial Annual files.  
Data on the divergence between insider cash-flow rights and controls rights are assembled from 
Gompers et al. (2010).9  Because this insider ownership data set covers the period from 1994 to 
2002, we use the same time period as our sample period.  This implies that the sample period 
                                                            
9 We thank Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick for making the data available to us. 
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actually used for our empirical analysis runs from 1997 to 2002 since we perform the nonlinear 
GMM estimation in first differences with twice lagged instruments.   
We collect from Compustat all the firm-level data items required for estimating financial 
constraints as modeled in the previous section.  Data on the number of analysts following the 
firm and on financial restatements are obtained from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and from the Financial Restatement Database collected by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), respectively.  We delete any firm-year observations 
with missing data, and exclude from our sample all firms that are in the financial industry 
(Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes 6000–6999) or the regulated utility industry (SIC 
codes 4900–4999).  Our final sample consists of 25,377 firm-year observations. 
 
3.2. Variable definitions 
 
3.2.1. Insider ownership structure 
 
Our proxies for the insider cash-flow rights and control rights are constructed using the 
insider ownership data set of Gompers et al. (2010).  The data set contains information on 
dividends per share, the number of votes per share, the number of shares outstanding, and the 
total number of shares owned by corporate insiders including officers and directors for each class 
of stock at multiclass firms in the U.S.  We then calculate the insider cash-flow rights and control 
rights at these firms as the total percentage of dividends and the total percentage of votes owned 
by the insiders across classes, respectively.10  For single-class firms, the insider cash-flow rights 
and control rights are equal by definition.     
We use three measures to capture the deviation between insider control rights and insider 
cash-flow rights.  The first measure, Divergence, is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
                                                            
10 Following Gompers et al. (2010), we assume that cash-flow rights are equal across classes if the dividend 
data do not exist. 
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if insider control rights exceed insider cash-flow rights and zero otherwise.  The second measure, 
the Control-ownership wedge, is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash-
flow rights held by insiders.  The third measure is defined as the ratio of the insider control rights 
and cash-flow rights (Control-to-ownership ratio).11 
 
3.2.2. Other Euler equation variables and instruments 
 
Our specification for the Euler equation estimation includes a rich set of firm-level and 
industry-level variables, in addition to the measure for insider ownership structure, in order to 
capture all the observable firm characteristics and factors that influence the shadow cost of 
external finance.12  These variables include firm size (log total assets), profitability (the cash 
flow-to-assets ratio), cash holdings (the liquid assets-to-assets ratio), and dividend paying status 
(the cash dividend dummy), as well as firm and industry investment opportunities (firm and 
industry sales growth) and firm and industry leverage (firm and industry debt-to-assets ratios).  
Analyst coverage is included as a proxy for asymmetric information.  The twice lagged 
instruments used in the GMM estimation include all the Euler-equation variables.  Following 
Whited and Wu (2006), we also use as lagged instruments inventories, depreciation, current 
assets, the net value of capital stock, current liabilities, and tax payments, all of which are 
deflated by total assets. 
The detailed definitions for these variables as well as all the other variables used in the 
paper are provided in Table 1.  Table 2 provides summary statistics for the entire sample.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
3.3. Univariate analyses 
                                                            
11 These definitions are standard in the ownership structure literature.  See, for example, La Porta et al. 
(1999) and Claessens et al. (2000), among others.   
 
12 We construct these variables based on the definitions in Whited and Wu (2006).  
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Before conducting the formal Euler equation structural analysis in the next section, we 
first take an initial look at some simple split-sample summary statistics to see if there are any 
broad patterns in the data that are consistent with our main hypothesis on the relationship 
between insiders’ control-ownership divergence and firms’ financing constraints.  Specifically, 
we split the sample into groups with and without insider control-ownership divergence and 
compare the mean values of a variety of financial variables.  This kind of analysis is analogous to 
the more traditional approach to indentify financially constrained firms, which sorts firms by 
firm characteristics that are believed to be associated with external finance constraints.  The 
summary statistics for these two groups of firms are presented in Panel A of Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
As can be seen from the table, the results are somewhat mixed.  For instance, we find that 
firms with insider control-ownership divergence, on average, tend to have lower investment, 
lower cash flows, lower dividend payout ratios, and lower sales growth than firms without the 
control-ownership divergence.  All these differences are statistically significant at the 5% level 
or better.  These results suggest that firms with excess insider control rights appear to be more 
financially constrained than the others.  However, we also find that firms with insider control-
ownership divergence, on average, tend to be larger in size, consistent with the pattern shown in 
Gompers et al. (2010).  One possible explanation for this difference is that complex ownership 
structures such as multiple-class shares are more likely to appear in larger firms.  Therefore, firm 
size in this case might be a proxy for ownership complexity rather than financing constraints.  In 
addition, firms with excess insider control rights have more debt and are followed by slightly 
more analysts than firms without such divergence.  These differences, however, might be driven 
simply by firm size since larger firms tend to have higher debt-to-assets ratios and more analyst 
coverage.  
This simple split-sample comparison analysis shows the potential bias and risk in using 
the traditional approach to indentify financially constrained firms, which sorts firms by firm-
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specific characteristics that are believed to be associated with difficult access to external finance.  
The financial variables by themselves are not direct measures of financing constraints.  As can be 
seen from the above analysis, sorting by different variables (e.g., cash flows versus size) can 
result in opposite interpretations.  This highlights the importance and advantage of using the 
structural index approach (Whited and Wu, 2006) to identify financial constraints, which is 
achieved via GMM estimation of an investment Euler equation augmented to account for 
financial frictions and encompass multiple factors that might affect financing constraints 
simultaneously into the model.  Furthermore, using the structural approach allows us to clearly 
identify and examine the direct impact of the insider control-ownership divergence on external 
finance constraints rather than the indirect impact through other factors, while avoiding the 
common estimation problems such as simultaneity that plague reduced-form analyses.  Therefore, 
in the next section, we take a structural approach and explore the relationship between the insider 
control-ownership divergence and external finance constraints by estimating the Euler equation 
of a standard intertemporal investment model augmented to account for financial constraints. 
About 6% of our firm-year observations are categorized as having insider control-
ownership divergence.  One might wonder just how many firms have an insider control-
ownership wedge that is large enough to make a difference, especially in a developed country 
like the United States.  An in-depth look at our sample reveals that out of 273 dual-class sample 
firms in the U.S., 154 have an insider control-ownership wedge that is greater than 0.20, which is 
generally considered to be a significant divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights 
even among developing countries where excess control is a serious problem (Claessens et al., 
2000).  These high-wedge firms cover a variety of industries and include large S&P 500 firms 
such as Ford Motor Co. and Adolph Coors Co. as well as smaller firms such as American 
Biogenetic Sciences Inc.  Indeed, anecdotal evidence also suggests that the potential 
expropriation of other investors by insiders such as founding families, who retain their controls 
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through the dual-class share structure, can have a significant impact on firm value and firm 
outcomes, even in the U.S.13  
Finally, we explore the differences in the cost of equity and the cost of debt financing 
between firms with and without insider control-ownership divergence in order to get a more 
direct sense on whether the control-ownership divergence seems to be associated with costly 
external finance.  Panel B of Table 3 reports these results.   
First, we examine the cost of bank loans.  We obtain the loan pricing data for our sample 
firms from the DealScan database, which covers detailed information on private loans to U.S. 
and foreign corporations since 1986.  The cost of bank loans is measured by Loan spread, which 
is the interest rate spread over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) or LIBOR equivalent 
on a loan plus associated loan origination fees (in basis points).  Thus, it is an all-inclusive 
measure of loan price.  As can be seen from Panel B of Table 3, the average loan spread for firms 
with insider control-ownership divergence is approximately 23 basis points higher than that for 
firms without such divergence even though firms with the control-ownership divergence are 
relatively larger firms.  The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Second, we examine the cost of public debt.  We collect our sample of debt issues from 
the Mergent Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD), which contains detailed information 
on public debt issues since 1980.  Following the literature (e.g., Qiu and Yu, 2009), the cost of 
public debt, Credit spread, is defined as the difference, in basis points, between a corporate 
bond’s yield to maturity and a linearly interpolated Treasury bond yield of identical maturity.14  
The average credit spread for firms with insider control-ownership divergence is 42 basis points 
higher than that for firms without the divergence.  The difference is both statistically significant 
(at the 1% level) and economically significant (about 20% of the sample average credit spread).  
                                                            
13 For example, see the recent case on a U.S. dual-class company, Adelphia Communications Corporation’s 
bankruptcy, the eleventh-largest bankruptcy case in history, described in Gilson and Villalonga (2009). 
 
14 Following Qiu and Yu (2009), we interpolate the one-year, three-year, five-year, seven-year, ten-year, and 
30-year constant maturity Treasury yields, obtained from the Federal Reserve’s Release (H15), into a piecewise 
linear term structure.  
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In addition, we examine the cost of equity.  Following Dong et al. (2006), we calculate 
the annualized cost of equity based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) using the 
market risk premium calculated as the average annual premium of the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted index over the risk-free rate over the preceding 30 
years.15  These estimates also indicate that firms with insider control-ownership divergence are 
subject to higher financing costs.  As can be seen from Panel B of Table 3, the average cost of 
equity for firms with insider excess control rights is significantly higher than that for the other 
firms.  
Together, the ancillary evidence above suggests that insider ownership structure indeed 
appears to impact the cost of external finance.  In the next section, we formally investigate the 
relationship between insider excess control rights and external finance constraints using the 
investment Euler-equation estimation.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Ownership structure and financial constraints 
 
4.1.1. Euler-equation estimates 
 
In this section, we investigate whether a firm’s insider ownership structure affects its 
external finance constraints by estimating the Euler equation for the model given by Eq. (8).  Our 
parameterization of the shadow cost of external finance, i, t+1, is specified in Eq. (10), using the 
original nine financial variables in Whited and Wu (2006) plus a measure for the insider control-
ownership divergence.   
                                                            
15 Extreme estimates of the CAPM cost of equity (outside the range of 300–3,000 basis points, which are 
less than 1% of our sample) are winsorized. 
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Table 4 reports the Euler-equation estimation results.  In Panel A (columns 1 through 4), 
insider excess control is measured by Divergence, which is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if insider control rights exceed insider cash-flow rights and zero otherwise.  In Panel 
B (columns 5 through 8) and Panel C (columns 9 through 12), the measures to capture the 
deviation between insider control rights and cash-flow rights are Control-ownership wedge and 
Control-to-ownership ratio, respectively.    
[Insert Table 4 here] 
For each panel, we employ the following estimation procedure (Whited and Wu, 2006).  
In the first column of each panel, we start with the most general model, in which all ten variables 
in Eq. (10) are used to parameterize i, t+1.  The specification in each subsequent column drops 
the financial variable with the smallest t-value (i.e., the largest p-value) from the previous 
column.  We perform two tests on model specification.16  The first is the J-test of overidentifying 
restrictions commonly utilized in GMM estimations to evaluate the suitability of the model 
(Hansen, 1982).  Under the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified and all the GMM 
assumptions hold, the test statistic is chi-squared distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of overidentifying restrictions.  A rejection of the null hypothesis produced by the J-test 
implies that the model is misspecified and/or that the instruments do not satisfy the required 
orthogonality conditions (e.g., the instruments are not truly exogenous and thus, are invalid).  
The second is the L-test of exclusion restrictions in Whited and Wu (2006).  In essence, the L-
test assesses whether a variable or a set of variables belong in the Euler equation by comparing 
the minimized GMM objective functions for the most general and for a more parsimonious 
model (using the same set of instrumental variables and therefore having the same weighting 
matrices in the GMM objective functions), the difference of which is distributed as chi-squared 
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of excluded variables.  A small p-value from the L-
                                                            
16 See Whited and Wu (2006) for detailed discussions on the test statistics and their underlying distribution 
assumptions. 
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test indicates that the omitted variables belong to the Euler equation and should not have been 
excluded from the model.   
In the first three columns of Panel A in Table 4, the J-test does not produce a rejection of 
the exclusion restrictions, indicating that these models are not misspecified despite the 
deterministic specification of Eq. (8).  In the fourth column, where we drop the firm sales growth, 
the model rejects the exclusion restrictions.  The p-value of the L-test in column 4 also indicates 
that the omitted financial variables are jointly significant.  Therefore, column 3 contains our final 
specification for the shadow cost of external funds, i, t+1.  Similarly, when we use the different 
measures for insider ownership structure in Panel B and Panel C of Table 4, we reach the same 
final specifications, in column 7 and column 11, respectively.  Our final specification for i, t+1, 
therefore, includes the log of assets, the cash flow-to-assets ratio, the debt-to-assets ratio, the 
dividend payment dummy, firm sales growth, industry sales growth, the number of analysts 
following the firm, and the measure for insider ownership structure: 
i,t+1 = 0 +1(industry sales growth)i,t+1 +2(firm sales growth)i,t+1 
+3(log(assets))i,t+1 +4(cash flow/assets)i,t+1 +5(long-term debt/assets)i,t+1 
+6(cash dividend dummy)i,t+1 + 7(number of analysts following the firm)i,t+1  
 +8(insider control-ownership divergence measure)i,t+1.      (13) 
 
4.1.2. Discussion 
 
The first thing to note from the Euler-equation estimation results in Table 4 is that our 
final specification and estimates are largely consistent with the Whited-Wu financial constraints 
index (Whited and Wu, 2006).  A firm will have a higher shadow value of external funds, or in 
other words, be more financially constrained, if it is smaller in size, has lower cash flow, lower 
sales growth or higher leverage, belongs to a high growth industry, or does not pay dividends.  
The adjustment cost parameter is positive and significant, and the mark-up is significant and 
greater than one.  The only slight difference is that our final model includes the number of 
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analysts, which enters with a significantly negative sign.  This variable is dropped in the last 
round of model selection in Whited and Wu (2006), but it does have the same sign and 
significance, indicating that firms with asymmetric information problems are associated with 
difficult access to external finance.  For our sample firms and sample period, our estimation 
results indicate that the number of analysts should be included in the model.  This underlines the 
importance of ensuring parameter stability across firms and over time in non-experimental 
sample estimates as highlighted in Whited and Wu (2006). 
More importantly, the final specification for the shadow cost of external funds obtained 
from the estimation includes the measure for insider ownership structure.  Compared to the other 
indicators of possible financial constraints previously identified in the literature, our results 
suggest that insider ownership structure is also an important factor that impacts firm financial 
constraints.  The coefficients on all three measures of insider ownership structure are positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level.  A larger divergence between insider control rights 
and cash-flow rights is associated with a higher shadow cost of external funds; that is, firms 
whose insiders have large excess control rights will be more financially constrained.  The effect 
of insider ownership structure on external finance constraints is also economically significant.  
Specifically, the estimates in column 3 of Table 4 suggest that the existence of a divergence 
between insider control rights and cash-flow rights is associated with an increase of 12.7 
percentage points in the shadow cost of external funds.  Similarly, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the Control-ownership wedge or in the Control-to-ownership ratio increases the 
shadow cost of external funds by approximately 13 percentage points.  These effects are quite 
substantial given that the mean estimated shadow cost of external funds is about 52%.  
Finally, following Whited and Wu (2006), we construct a financial constraints index 
based on our Euler-equation estimates and sort our sample firms by the index to evaluate how 
well our estimation captures firm financial constraints.  The idea is to see whether firms 
categorized as financially constrained by our estimation demonstrate characteristics that would 
indicate difficult access to external finance.  Specifically, the time t value of the index is 
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constructed based on the estimates from column 7 of Table 4, using the Control-ownership 
wedge to measure the insider excess control rights:17  
0.912(Control-ownership wedge)it – 0.102(Cash flow/assets)it  
– 0.043(Cash dividend dummy)it + 0.037(Debt/assets)it – 0.063(Log assets)it  
– 0.019(Analyst coverage)it + 0.134(Industry sales growth)it 
       – 0.085(Firm sales growth)it.        (14) 
We categorize our sample firms into three groups, from Least constrained to Most constrained, 
according to the financial constraints index.  We report the mean values of various firm 
characteristics, including all the variables in our index as well as firm investment and measures 
for the insider ownership structure, for each group in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results in Table 5 indicate that estimates from our model perform well in capturing 
external finance constraints.  The firms that are categorized as most constrained by our index 
exhibit characteristics that are consistent with the existence of financial constraints as shown in 
the literature (e.g., Whited and Wu, 2006).  For example, they are smaller in size and have less 
analyst coverage and lower cash flows, sales growth, and dividend payments.  The level of 
investment drops by 17% as the level of financial constraints increases.  More importantly, 
notice that the most constrained firms also differ significantly from the least constrained firms in 
terms of ownership structure.  There is a positive relationship between the level of financial 
constraints and all measures of the insider control-ownership divergence.      
Overall, our results from the Euler-equation estimation indicate that insider ownership 
structure is an important factor that influences external finance constraints, and its effect remains 
strong and significant after controlling for a series of firm financial characteristics shown in the 
existing literature to affect firm financial constraints.  The relationship between insider 
ownership structure and external finance constraints is consistent with the hypothesis that insider 
                                                            
17  Using the other two measures of insider excess control rights to construct the index produces 
qualitatively similar results. 
 
22 
 
excess control rights increase the likelihood of insider expropriation of the other shareholders 
and creditors and therefore intensify external financial constraints. 
 
4.2. Factors influencing the link between insider control-ownership divergence and financial 
constraints 
 
In this section, we investigate the factors that influence the relationship between insider 
ownership structure and external finance constraints.  Our goal is to understand in what 
situations the divergence between insider control rights and cash-flow rights most severely 
affects the cost of external finance and increases financial constraints and, in turn, shed light on 
how such effects might be mitigated.  We examine the following set of factors: firm 
informational opacity, financial restatement and misreporting, and institutional ownership.  We 
implement the empirical estimation by including these factors and their interactions with the 
measure for insider ownership structure in the specification for i,t+1 and re-estimating the Euler 
equation.18  We use Control-ownership wedge and Control-to-ownership ratio as our measures 
for insider control-ownership divergence.  We expect that the effect of the insider control-
ownership divergence on external finance constraints should be more pronounced in situations 
where insiders with excess control rights are more likely to engage in self-dealing or 
expropriation activities.  Analyses based on sample splits instead of interaction terms produce 
qualitatively similar and robust results (unreported but available upon request).   
 
4.2.1. Firm informational opacity 
 
                                                            
18  Following the original estimation methodology, we also include all the associated twice lagged 
instruments.  
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Firm informational opacity makes monitoring by outside investors more difficult and 
therefore lowers the marginal costs to corporate insiders of engaging in self-dealing or 
expropriation activities.  We therefore expect to find a stronger link between the insider control-
ownership divergence and external financial constraints in firms with greater informational 
opacity.  Following previous studies (e.g., Lin et al., 2011), we use four widely used 
informational opacity measures in our analysis.  The four measures are: (1) firm size measured 
by log of assets, (2) the number of analysts following the firm, (3) whether the firm has debt 
ratings, and (4) whether the firm is included in the S&P 500 stock index.  Intuitively, larger firms, 
firms with credit ratings, firms followed by more analysts, and firms included in the S&P 500 
index tend to be firms with lower degrees of informational opacity.  To test our conjecture, we 
add each informational opacity measure and its interaction with the insider ownership structure 
to Eq. (13) and re-estimate the Euler equation using GMM estimation.  The empirical results are 
presented in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 As can be seen from the table, larger firms, firms with credit ratings, firms followed by 
more analysts, and firms included in S&P 500 are less financially constrained.  This corroborates 
the evidence in Whited and Wu (2006) that financially constrained firms are associated with 
higher degrees of informational opacity.  More interestingly, we find that firm informational 
opacity strengthens the link between the insider control-ownership divergence and external 
finance constraints, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the 
interaction terms between the insider control-ownership divergence and informational opacity 
measures across all model specifications.  In columns 5 and 10, we include all four measures of 
informational opacity as well as their respective interaction terms with the insider ownership 
structure together in Eq. (13) and re-estimate the Euler equation.  All coefficients on the 
interaction terms remain significantly negative.  Out of the four measures, analyst coverage 
seems to have the most statistically and economically significant effect on the link between the 
insider excess control rights and firm financial constraints.  For example, a one-standard-
24 
 
deviation increase in the number of analysts covering the firm reduces the impact of Control-
ownership wedge on the shadow cost of external funds by 0.297.  The J-test statistics indicate 
that these models including measures of informational opacity and their interactions with insider 
ownership structure are not misspecified.  Overall, these results confirm our conjecture that the 
link between insider excess control rights and external finance constraints is stronger in firms 
with higher degrees of informational opacity.  
 
4.2.2. Financial restatement and misreporting 
 
Financial restatements change a firm’s historical financial records, create uncertainty 
about the credibility of its financial reporting, and signal low quality of its information disclosure 
(Graham et al., 2008).  As a result, investors may have serious concerns about other aspects of 
the firm’s business operations and potential hidden actions.  Such concerns can be particularly 
strong for firms with a divergence between insider control rights and cash-flow rights, where 
corporate insiders have the incentives and the ability to expropriate other investors.  For these 
companies, financial restatements reflect negatively on current corporate insiders and can be 
viewed as symptomatic of larger issues of hidden self-dealing activities.  We thus expect to find 
a stronger link between the insider control-ownership divergence and external finance constraints 
in firms with financial restatements.  To test this, we add financial restatement dummy variables 
and their interactions with the divergence measure to Eq. (13) and re-estimate the Euler equation 
using GMM estimation. 
Our restatement data are obtained from the Financial Restatement Database collected by 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).  For the time period from 1997 to 2002, the 
database contains more than 900 announced financial restatements.19  We construct a dummy 
variable Restatement, which takes on the value one if the firm has any historical financial 
                                                            
19 The sample period used for estimation is therefore 2000 to 2002.  
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restatement record in the database and zero otherwise.  Furthermore, about half of the 
restatements are prompted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or by 
external auditors.  These cases are more likely to involve fraudulent misreporting.  Following 
Graham et al. (2008), we treat these restatements as potentially fraudulent cases and construct a 
dummy variable Fraudulent restatement, which equals one if the firm has any historical 
fraudulent restatement record in the database and zero otherwise.  We also interact these 
restatement indicators with the insider control-ownership divergence measures to see whether the 
effect of insider ownership structure on financial constraints is more prominent for the restating 
firms.  The estimates for models including these dummy variables and their interaction terms 
with insider excess control rights are presented in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 The results in columns 1 and 3 of Table 7 indicate that firms with financial restatements 
in the past tend to have a higher shadow value of external finance and are therefore more 
financially constrained.  Moreover, as expected, the link between the insider control-ownership 
wedge and external financial constraints is significantly stronger in firms with financial 
restatements.  In columns 2 and 4, we further add the Fraudulent restatement dummy and its 
interaction term with insider excess control rights.  Notice that since the Restatement dummy 
always equals one when the Fraudulent restatement dummy equals one, the coefficients on 
Fraudulent restatement and its interaction term capture the incremental effects of fraudulent 
misreporting over other types of restatements.  The significantly positive estimates on the 
interaction terms of Fraudulent restatement and insider excess control rights indicate that the 
link between the insider control-ownership divergence and firm financial constraints is even 
stronger for firms involved in fraudulent misreporting.  The J-test does not produce a rejection of 
the overidentifying restrictions in any model. 
 
4.2.3. Institutional ownership 
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Institutional investors play an important monitoring function in corporate governance.  
Institutions are likely to be better-informed investors and have strong incentives and capabilities 
to devote resources to monitoring because of their large amounts of investment at stake (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005).  Furthermore, as fiduciaries who invest on 
behalf of others, institutional investors are disciplined by rules and regulations designed to 
mitigate agency conflicts (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005).  As a result, the presence of 
institutional investors makes external monitoring more effective and thus increases the marginal 
costs to corporate insiders of engaging in expropriation or self-dealing activities.  In this section, 
we investigate how institutional ownership influences firm financial constraints as well as its 
impact on the link between the insider control-ownership divergence and external finance 
constraints.   
We examine two measures of institutional ownership.20  Our first measure, Institutional 
investor ownership, is computed as the number of shares held by all institutional investors 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding.  The second measure, Institutional 
blockholder ownership, is calculated as the number of shares held by all institutional 
blockholders (defined as those who own at least 5% of outstanding shares) divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding.  These measures are constructed from the Thomson Financial 
Institutional 13F Ownership database and have also been used in other recent studies (e.g., Qiu 
and Yu, 2009).  To the extent that higher institutional ownership is associated with more activist 
shareholder monitoring and discipline on the management and thus indicates better governance 
and mitigations of agency issues, institutional ownership should help to alleviate firm financial 
constraints.  In our Euler equation setting, this means that institutional ownership should have a 
negative effect on the shadow value of external finance.  We investigate this relationship in 
Table 8.   
[Insert Table 8 here] 
                                                            
20 Nikolov and Whited (2009) suggest that measures based on institutional ownership are less noisy proxies 
for governance than governance indices.  
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In columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 of Table 8, we include the measure of institutional ownership in 
Eq. (13) and re-estimate the investment Euler equation using GMM estimation.  The coefficients 
on Institutional investor ownership and Institutional blockholder ownership are indeed all 
negative and significant, suggesting that, everything else (including insider ownership structure) 
equal, firms with higher institutional ownership face lower external financial constraints.   
Moreover, we investigate whether the effect of the insider control-ownership divergence on 
financial constraints is mitigated in firms with higher institutional ownership by further adding 
the interaction of institutional ownership and the insider control-ownership divergence to Eq. (13) 
and re-estimating the Euler equation.  The intuition is that better corporate governance can have 
not only a direct effect on reducing external finance constraints but also an indirect effect 
through weakening the link between agency issues and financial constraints.  The results from 
these estimations are reported in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 of Table 8.  The estimates indicate that, 
as before, higher insider excess control rights and lower institutional ownership are associated 
with significantly higher firm financial constraints.  More interestingly, we find that the effect of 
the insider control-ownership divergence on external finance constraints is less pronounced in 
firms with higher institutional ownership, as indicated by the significantly negative coefficients 
on the interaction terms across all specifications.  Our results suggest that, conforming to the 
existing findings on the role of ownership and governance in alleviating agency problems, 
institutional ownership has a weakening effect on the positive link between insider excess 
control rights and firm financial constraints.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we identify an important mechanism through which the insider control-
ownership divergence may affect firm values.  Following the estimation strategy in Whited and 
Wu (2006), we examine the impact of the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow 
rights of corporate insiders on firms’ external finance constraints via GMM estimation of an 
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investment Euler equation.  Using a large sample of U.S. firms in the time period 1994 to 2002, 
we find that a wider divergence between insider control rights and cash-flow rights is associated 
with a significantly higher shadow value of external funds and therefore a higher degree of 
financial constraints. Moreover, we find that the effect of the insider control-ownership 
divergence on financial constraints is more pronounced for firms with higher levels of 
informational opacity as well as firms with financial restatements, especially those involved in 
fraudulent misreporting.  In addition, we find that institutional ownership weakens the 
relationship between insider excess control rights and external finance constraints, indicating the 
monitoring role of institutional investors on potential expropriation activities of corporate 
insiders.  Overall, our results imply that the insider control-ownership divergence increases the 
potential expropriation risks to outside investors and therefore intensifies external financing 
constraints.  They also highlight the importance of insider ownership structure as a determinant 
of firms’ external finance constraints and suggest that insider ownership structure can have a real 
impact on corporate financial outcomes.  These insights help to better our understanding of the 
value implication of ownership structure and delineate the contexts in which the separation of 
ownership and control might be a more serious concern. 
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Table 1   
Variable definitions 
 
This table provides definitions for all the variables used in the paper. 
 
Variable Definitions 
I/K Investment divided by capital stock.  Investment is capital 
expenditure (CAPEX).  Capital stock is the beginning period 
capital, which equals net property, plant, and equipment minus 
CAPEX plus depreciation and amortization. 
Cash flow/assets Cash flow divided by total assets.  Cash flow is defined as income 
plus depreciation and amortization. 
Cash dividend dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the firm pays cash dividends 
Dividend payout ratio Dividends divided by earnings 
Debt/assets Long-term debt divided by total assets 
Log assets Natural log of total assets 
Industrial sales growth Three-digit SIC industry asset-weighted average sales growth rate 
Firm sales growth Firm sales growth rate 
Analyst coverage Number of analysts following the firm 
Cash/assets  Liquid assets divided by total assets.  Liquid assets are defined as 
cash plus cash equivalents. 
Industry debt 
 
Three-digit SIC industry asset-weighted average long-term debt-to-
assets ratio 
MKT Return on the market portfolio 
SMB Return on a portfolio that is long small firms and short large firms 
HML Return on a portfolio that is long high book-to-market firms and 
short low book-to-market firms 
Divergence dummy A dummy variable that equals one if insider control rights exceed 
insider cash-flow rights 
Control-ownership wedge  Insider voting rights minus insider cash-flow rights 
Control-to-ownership ratio Insider voting rights divided by insider cash-flow rights 
S&P 500 dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the S&P 500 
stock index 
Credit rating dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the firm has an S&P credit 
rating 
Financial restatement dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a historical 
financial restatement record in the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) database 
Fraudulent restatement dummy A dummy variable that equals one if the firm has historical 
fraudulent financial restatements (prompted by the SEC or external 
auditors) recorded in the GAO database 
Institutional investor ownership Number of shares held by all institutional investors divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding 
Institutional blockholder ownership Number of shares held by all institutional blockholders (defined as 
those who own at least 5% of outstanding shares) divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding  
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Table 2   
Summary statistics 
 
This table presents the mean, standard deviation (STD), and number of observations (N) 
for all the variables used in the paper.  The sample period is 1994 to 2002.  Definitions of all the 
variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
Variable Mean STD N 
I/K 0.338 0.422 25,377 
Cash flow/assets 0.128 0.294 25,377 
Cash dividend dummy 0.302 0.459 25,377 
Dividend payout ratio 0.132 0.475 25,377 
Debt/assets 0.185 0.233 25,377 
Log assets 4.493 2.972 25,377 
Industry sales growth 0.059 0.140 25,377 
Firm sales growth 0.086 0.389 25,377 
Analyst coverage 2.490 3.164 25,377 
Cash/assets 0.054 0.145 25,377 
Industry debt 0.263 0.097 25,377 
MKT 0.016 0.039 25,377 
SMB 0.017 0.029 25,377 
HML 0.002 0.047 25,377 
Divergence dummy 0.059 0.236 25,377 
Control-ownership wedge  0.013 0.142 25,377 
Control-to-ownership ratio 1.050 0.386 25,377 
S&P 500 dummy 0.076 0.265 25,377 
Credit rating dummy 0.248 0.432 25,377 
Financial restatement dummy 0.041 0.198 19,154 
Fraudulent restatement dummy 0.024 0.152 19,154 
Institutional investor ownership 0.237 0.282 19,154 
Institutional blockholder ownership 0.235 0.283 19,154 
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Table 3  
Control-ownership divergence, firm characteristics, and cost of financing 
 
This table presents the mean values of a variety of financial variables (Panel A) and measures of 
cost of financing (Panel B) for the sample firms, distinguishing between firms with and without insider 
control-ownership divergence.  The sample period is 1994 to 2002.  Loan spread is the interest rate 
spread over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent on a loan plus associated loan origination fees (in basis points).  
Credit spread is defined as the difference, in basis points, between a corporate bond’s yield to maturity 
and a linearly interpolated Treasury bond yield of identical maturity.  Cost of equity is estimated based on 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) using the market risk premium calculated as the average annual 
premium of the CRSP value-weighted index over the risk-free rate over the preceding 30 years.  
Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Divergence = 1 Divergence = 0 Difference: (1) - (2) 
I/K 0.261 0.343 -0.082 *** 
Cash flow/assets 0.108 0.129 -0.021 *** 
Dividend payout ratio 0.103 0.134 -0.031 ** 
Debt/assets 0.199 0.184 0.015 ** 
Log assets 5.554 4.426 1.128 *** 
Firm sales growth 0.066 0.088 -0.022 ** 
Analyst coverage 2.633 2.481 0.152 * 
Cash/assets 0.032 0.055 -0.023 *** 
          
Panel B (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Divergence = 1 Divergence = 0 Difference: (1) - (2) 
Loan spread (basis points) 194.987 172.351 22.636 *** 
Credit spread (basis points) 258.748 217.170 41.578 *** 
Cost of equity (%) 11.153 10.214 0.939 *** 
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Table 4 
Insider control-ownership divergence and external finance constraints: Euler-equation estimates 
 
This table presents the estimates from nonlinear GMM estimation of the investment Euler equation (Whited, 1992; Whited and Wu, 2006).  The estimation is 
done on the model given by Eq. (8) in first differences with twice lagged instruments.  The sample period used for estimation is 1997 to 2002.  2 and 3 are adjustment 
cost parameters, and μ is a mark-up.  Divergence is a dummy variable that equals one if insider control rights exceed insider cash-flow rights and zero otherwise.  Control-
ownership wedge is defined as the difference between insider control rights and cash-flow rights.  Control-to-ownership ratio is defined as the ratio of insider control 
rights and cash-flow rights.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  The p-values for the coefficients are reported in brackets.  The p-values of the J-
test (test of overidentifying restrictions) and the L-test (test of variable exclusion restrictions) on model specification are reported in the last two rows.  Significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
  Panel A   Panel B   Panel C 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
2 0.628 0.730 0.651 0.683 0.649 0.702 0.650 0.681 0.675 0.696 0.650 0.672 
[0.019]** [0.015]** [0.019]** [0.017]** [0.002]*** [0.005]*** [0.003]*** [0.007]*** [0.014]** [0.017]** [0.015]** [0.016]** 
3 -0.417 -0.504 -0.463 -0.484 -0.429 -0.503 -0.463 -0.484 -0.432 -0.497 -0.462 -0.476 
[0.032]** [0.031]** [0.033]** [0.039]** [0.018]** [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.025]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.021]** [0.019]** 
Mark-up () 1.074 0.986 1.057 0.972 1.105 0.973 1.069 1.002 1.069 1.011 1.061 1.026 
[0.027]** [0.025]** [0.024]** [0.026]** [0.027]** [0.031]** [0.028]** [0.030]** [0.025]** [0.026]** [0.021]** [0.023]** 
Divergence dummy 0.125 0.119 0.127 0.130 
[0.002]*** [0.007]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** 
Control-ownership wedge 0.761 0.885 0.912 0.947 
[0.002]*** [0.009]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** 
Control-to-ownership ratio 0.342 0.312 0.330 0.306 
[0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.004]*** [0.008]*** 
Cash flow/assets -0.113 -0.100 -0.106 -0.115 -0.111 -0.097 -0.102 -0.112 -0.122 -0.111 -0.104 -0.117 
[0.019]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.015]** [0.024]** [0.026]** [0.023]** [0.021]** [0.022]** [0.020]** [0.021]** [0.016]** 
Cash dividend dummy -0.038 -0.046 -0.041 -0.043 -0.040 -0.045 -0.043 -0.048 -0.044 -0.048 -0.044 -0.050 
[0.066]* [0.039]** [0.054]* [0.051]* [0.044]** [0.071]* [0.116] [0.109] [0.034]** [0.033]** [0.035]** [0.032]** 
Debt/assets 0.045 0.046 0.043 0.049 0.039 0.042 0.037 0.040 0.031 0.035 0.030 0.034 
   [0.032]** [0.034]** [0.037]** [0.035]**   [0.061]* [0.039]** [0.062]* [0.058]*   [0.136] [0.043]** [0.136] [0.128] 
 
(continued on the next page) 
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Table 4  
Insider control-ownership divergence and external finance constraints: Euler equation estimates 
(Continued) 
 
  Panel A   Panel B   Panel C 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Log assets -0.052 -0.047 -0.052 -0.055 -0.069 -0.057 -0.063 -0.067 -0.072 -0.052 -0.057 -0.051 
[0.078]* [0.077]* [0.069]* [0.062]* [0.029]** [0.033]** [0.031]** [0.028]** [0.036]** [0.074]* [0.071]* [0.064]* 
Analyst coverage -0.018 -0.016 -0.011 -0.012 -0.020 -0.016 -0.019 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 -0.012 -0.015 
[0.031]** [0.032]** [0.034]** [0.037]** [0.028]** [0.025]** [0.028]** [0.031]** [0.034]** [0.051]* [0.057]* [0.062]* 
Industry sales growth 0.166 0.169 0.148 0.167 0.151 0.164 0.134 0.145 0.171 0.132 
[0.034]** [0.031]** [0.035]** [0.031]** [0.095]* [0.032]** [0.120] [0.114] [0.023]** [0.141] 
Firm sales growth -0.072 -0.080 -0.071 -0.091 -0.091 -0.085 -0.096 -0.080 -0.086 -0.078 -0.084 
[0.129] [0.041]** [0.127] [0.033]** [0.053]* [0.032]** [0.029]** [0.063]* [0.038]** [0.062]* [0.056]* 
Cash/assets -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 
[0.175] [0.182] [0.149] [0.153] [0.168] [0.164] 
Industry debt -0.037 -0.039 -0.041 
[0.218] [0.206] [0.201] 
MKT -0.767 -0.727 -0.779 -0.802 -0.663 -0.774 -0.720 -0.763 -0.684 -0.573 -0.625 -0.662 
[0.033]** [0.102] [0.036]** [0.078]* [0.134] [0.035]** [0.133] [0.122] [0.034]** [0.109] [0.093]* [0.079]* 
SMB 0.956 1.241 1.137 1.217 1.429 1.281 1.211 1.359 1.099 1.188 1.127 1.317 
[0.080]* [0.040]** [0.096]* [0.068]* [0.049]** [0.181] [0.170] [0.160] [0.164] [0.188] [0.165] [0.036]** 
HML 1.226 1.064 1.174 1.272 1.164 1.259 1.163 1.056 1.003 0.851 1.053 0.979 
[0.036]** [0.127] [0.087]* [0.077]* [0.018]** [0.020]** [0.021]** [0.124] [0.097]* [0.037]** [0.091]* [0.105] 
Number of observations 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 
Number of firms 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 
p-Value of J-test 0.422 0.263 0.217 0.034** 0.473 0.284 0.213 0.038** 0.431 0.220 0.206 0.032** 
p-Value of L-test   0.431 0.220 0.043**     0.455 0.287 0.041**     0.497 0.269 0.040** 
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Table 5   
Univariate analyses based on structural financial constraints index 
 
This table presents the mean values of a variety of firm characteristics for sample firms sorted by 
a financial constraints index based on the Euler-equation estimates from column 7 of Table 4.  
Specifically, the time t value of the index is constructed as 0.912(Control-ownership wedge)it – 
0.102(Cash flow/assets)it  – 0.043(Cash dividend dummy)it + 0.037(Debt/assets)it – 0.063(Log assets)it – 
0.019(Analyst coverage)it + 0.134(Industry sales growth)it – 0.085(Firm sales growth)it.  The sample 
period is 1994 to 2002.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  Significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Structural financial constraints index 
Low Medium High Difference 
Variable Least constrained   
Most 
constrained (3) - (1) 
Divergence dummy 0.035 0.037 0.106 0.071 *** 
Control-ownership wedge 0.003 0.004 0.031 0.028 *** 
Control-to-ownership ratio 1.018 1.020 1.112 0.094 *** 
I/K 0.367 0.344 0.304 -0.063 *** 
Cash flow/assets 0.173 0.111 0.099 -0.074 *** 
Cash dividend dummy 0.586 0.239 0.080 -0.506 *** 
Debt/assets 0.177 0.187 0.190 0.013 *** 
Log assets 7.033 4.577 1.870 -5.163 *** 
Industry sales growth 0.048 0.058 0.072 0.024 *** 
Firm sales growth 0.139 0.110 0.010 -0.129 *** 
Analyst coverage 5.335 1.345 0.790 -4.545 *** 
Structural financial constraints index 0.277 0.576 0.742 0.465 *** 
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Table 6 
Firm information opacity and the effect of insider control-ownership divergence on external finance constraints 
 
This table presents the estimates from nonlinear GMM estimation of the investment Euler equation (Whited, 1992; Whited and Wu, 2006).  The estimation is done 
on the model given by Eq. (8) in first differences with twice lagged instruments.  The sample period used for estimation is 1997 to 2002.  2 and 3 are adjustment cost 
parameters, and μ is a mark-up.  Control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between insider control rights and cash-flow rights.  Control-to-ownership ratio is 
defined as the ratio of insider control rights and cash-flow rights.  S&P 500 is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is in the S&P 500 stock index.  Credit rating 
dummy equals one if the firm has an S&P credit rating.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  The p-values for the coefficients are reported in 
brackets.  The p-values of the J-test (test of overidentifying restrictions) on model specification are reported in the last row.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
2 0.649 0.634 0.772 0.648 0.624 0.651 0.626 0.780 0.651 0.625 
[0.021]** [0.014]** [0.008]** [0.004]*** [0.025]** [0.019]** [0.024]** [0.021]** [0.012]** [0.027]** 
3 -0.463 -0.454 -0.531 -0.462 -0.438 -0.462 -0.493 -0.532 -0.463 -0.431 
[0.026]** [0.046]** [0.082]* [0.069]* [0.071]* [0.123] [0.141] [0.041]** [0.015]** [0.117] 
Mark-up () 1.068 1.069 1.070 1.069 1.043 1.063 1.076 1.071 1.060 1.041 
[0.047]** [0.036]** [0.016]** [0.042]** [0.046]** [0.008]*** [0.012]** [0.029]** [0.011]** [0.016]** 
Control-ownership wedge (Wedge) 0.912 0.922 0.917 0.916 0.841 
[0.007]*** [0.003]*** [0.016]** [0.002]*** [0.008]*** 
Control-to-ownership ratio (Ratio) 0.342 0.315 0.332 0.346 0.221 
[0.002]*** [0.011]** [0.002]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Wedge x Log assets -0.116 -0.104 
[0.027]** [0.062]* 
Wedge x Analyst coverage -0.102 -0.094 
[0.031]** [0.003]*** 
Wedge x S&P500 -0.391 -0.287 
[0.000]*** [0.042]** 
Wedge x Credit rating dummy -0.519 -0.437 
[0.000]*** [0.012]** 
Ratio x Log assets -0.036 -0.024 
[0.014]** [0.073]* 
Ratio x Analyst coverage -0.035 -0.031 
[0.016]** [0.006]*** 
Ratio x S&P500 -0.138 -0.127 
[0.011]** [0.039]** 
Ratio x Credit rating dummy -0.259 -0.231 
                           [0.027]** [0.015]** 
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Table 6 
Firm information opacity and the effect of insider control-ownership divergence on external finance constraints  
(Continued) 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
S&P500 -0.127 -0.121 -0.026 -0.020 
[0.001]*** [0.017]** [0.000]*** [0.014]** 
Credit rating dummy -0.041 -0.036 -0.035 -0.031 
[0.023]** [0.028]** [0.017]** [0.026]** 
Log assets -0.059 -0.065 -0.061 -0.062 -0.056 -0.059 -0.052 -0.061 -0.063 -0.053 
[0.080]* [0.143] [0.027]** [0.022]** [0.088]* [0.151] [0.028]** [0.096]* [0.178] [0.162] 
Analyst coverage -0.019 -0.018 -0.014 -0.019 -0.016 -0.019 -0.014 -0.015 -0.018 -0.021 
[0.017]** [0.084]* [0.011]** [0.070]* [0.024]** [0.018]** [0.051]* [0.079]* [0.036]** [0.016]** 
Cash flow/assets -0.103 -0.104 -0.102 -0.108 -0.093 -0.103 -0.103 -0.101 -0.106 -0.101 
[0.022]** [0.027]** [0.032]** [0.027]** [0.025]** [0.006]*** [0.035]** [0.007]*** [0.030]** [0.041]** 
Cash dividend dummy -0.041 -0.037 -0.045 -0.042 -0.041 -0.042 -0.035 -0.046 -0.038 -0.035 
[0.039]** [0.075]* [0.045]** [0.156] [0.137] [0.091]* [0.031]** [0.112] [0.114] [0.191] 
Debt/assets 0.033 0.028 0.048 0.029 0.026 0.034 0.038 0.047 0.029 0.027 
[0.029]** [0.091]* [0.039]** [0.113] [0.128] [0.116] [0.063]* [0.038]** [0.124] [0.114] 
Industry sales growth 0.135 0.123 0.158 0.132 0.126 0.135 0.109 0.158 0.131 0.124 
[0.186] [0.193] [0.072]* [0.133] [0.175] [0.091]* [0.194] [0.026]** [0.022]** [0.082]* 
Firm sales growth -0.076 -0.074 -0.081 -0.075 -0.072 -0.078 -0.071 -0.081 -0.074 -0.073 
[0.023]** [0.053]* [0.148] [0.062]* [0.070]* [0.037]** [0.148] [0.186] [0.085]* [0.086]* 
MKT -0.861 -0.867 -0.806 -0.648 -0.694 -0.669 -0.654 -0.819 -0.648 -0.636 
[0.199] [0.081]* [0.062]* [0.112] [0.182] [0.193] [0.038]** [0.074] [0.056]* [0.180] 
SMB 1.702 1.292 1.751 1.619 1.583 1.224 1.530 1.200 1.723 1.182 
[0.027]** [0.064]* [0.030]** [0.102] [0.128] [0.197] [0.064]* [0.028]** [0.092]* [0.209] 
HML 1.051 1.001 1.032 1.315 0.982 1.093 1.094 1.416 1.015 0.994 
[0.030]** [0.020]** [0.169] [0.161] [0.034]** [0.058]* [0.121] [0.063]* [0.034]** [0.036]** 
Number of observations 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 
Number of firms 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 
p-Value of J-test 0.221 0.239 0.240 0.231 0.187 0.213 0.257 0.258 0.264 0.196 
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Table 7 
Financial restatements and the effect of insider control-ownership divergence on external finance 
constraints 
 
This table presents the estimates from nonlinear GMM estimation of the investment Euler equation (Whited, 
1992; Whited and Wu, 2006).  The estimation is done on the model given by Eq. (8) in first differences with twice 
lagged instruments.  The sample period used for estimation is 2000 to 2002.  2 and 3 are adjustment cost 
parameters, and μ is a mark-up.  Control-ownership wedge is defined as the difference between insider control rights 
and cash-flow rights.  Control-to-ownership ratio is defined as the ratio of insider control rights and cash-flow rights.  
Financial restatement is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a historical financial restatement record in 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) database.  Fraudulent restatement is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm has historical fraudulent financial restatements (prompted by the SEC or external auditors) 
recorded in the GAO database.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  The p-values for the 
coefficients are reported in brackets.  The p-values of the J-test (test of overidentifying restrictions) on model 
specification are reported in the last row.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2 0.584 0.560 0.567 0.553 
[0.007]*** [0.008]*** [0.012]** [0.014]** 
3 -0.451 -0.437 -0.433 -0.425 
[0.040]** [0.042]** [0.042]** [0.048]** 
Mark-up () 1.063 1.086 1.082 1.136 
[0.037]** [0.037]** [0.018]** [0.019]** 
Control-ownership wedge (Wedge) 0.905 0.842 
[0.004]*** [0.009]*** 
Control-to-ownership ratio (Ratio) 0.412 0.372 
[0.005]*** [0.007]*** 
Wedge x Financial restatement dummy 0.239 0.253 
[0.000]*** [0.019]** 
Wedge x Fraudulent restatement dummy 0.371 
[0.005]*** 
Ratio x Financial restatement dummy 0.082 0.060 
[0.006]*** [0.018]** 
Ratio x Fraudulent restatement dummy 0.116 
[0.002]*** 
Financial restatement dummy 0.083 0.072 0.081 0.071 
[0.015]** [0.034]** [0.001]*** [0.020]** 
Fraudulent restatement dummy 0.135 0.126 
      [0.014]**    [0.007]*** 
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Table 7   
Financial restatements and the effect of insider control-ownership divergence on external finance 
constraints  
(Continued) 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cash flow/assets -0.104 -0.118 -0.128 -0.139 
[0.019]** [0.021]** [0.017]** [0.018]** 
Cash dividend dummy -0.040 -0.038 -0.055 -0.051 
[0.066]* [0.075]* [0.107] [0.126] 
Debt/assets 0.026 0.025 0.030 0.028 
[0.071]* [0.076]* [0.179] [0.189] 
Log assets -0.052 -0.055 -0.069 -0.072 
[0.066]* [0.062]* [0.173] [0.158] 
Industry sales growth 0.128 0.134 0.144 0.171 
[0.088]* [0.085]* [0.156] [0.141] 
Firm sales growth -0.075 -0.071 -0.052 -0.045 
[0.161] [0.188] [0.033]** [0.038]** 
Analyst coverage -0.017 -0.015 -0.016 -0.014 
[0.056]* [0.079]* [0.171] [0.182] 
MKT -0.794 -0.746 -0.926 -0.840 
[0.042]** [0.044]** [0.038]** [0.040]** 
SMB 1.639 1.792 1.728 1.855 
[0.037]** [0.054]* [0.040]** [0.067]* 
HML 1.409 1.299 1.543 1.390 
[0.035]** [0.037]** [0.038]** [0.039]** 
Number of observations 12,567 12,567 12,567 12,567 
Number of firms 3,935 3,935 3,935 3,935 
p-Value of J-test 0.297 0.301 0.252 0.306 
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Table 8 
Institutional ownership and the effect of insider control-ownership divergence on external finance constraints 
 
This table presents the estimates from nonlinear GMM estimation of the investment Euler equation (Whited, 1992; 
Whited and Wu, 2006).  The estimation is done on the model given by Eq. (8) in first differences with twice lagged instruments.  
The sample period used for estimation is 1997 to 2002.  2 and 3 are adjustment cost parameters, and μ is a mark-up.  Control-
ownership wedge is defined as the difference between insider control rights and cash-flow rights.  Control-to-ownership ratio is 
defined as the ratio of insider control rights and cash-flow rights.  Institutional investor ownership is computed as the number of 
shares held by all institutional investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding.  Institutional blockholder ownership is 
calculated as the number of shares held by all institutional blockholders (defined as those who own at least 5% of outstanding 
shares) divided by the total number of shares outstanding.  Definitions of all the other variables are reported in Table 1.  The p-
values for the coefficients are reported in brackets.  The p-values of the J-test (test of overidentifying restrictions) on model 
specification are reported in the last row.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2 0.707 0.727 0.627 0.625 0.714 0.737 0.630 0.600 
[0.014]** [0.012]** [0.024]** [0.020]** [0.019]** [0.012]** [0.023]** [0.027]** 
3 -0.477 -0.472 -0.437 -0.443 -0.401 -0.456 -0.438 -0.462 
[0.019]** [0.014]** [0.097]* [0.051]* [0.128] [0.055]* [0.011]** [0.052]* 
Mark-up () 1.039 1.032 1.029 1.018 1.099 1.057 1.097 1.054 
[0.027]** [0.025]** [0.032]** [0.030]** [0.032]** [0.031]** [0.024]** [0.023]** 
Control-ownership wedge (Wedge) 0.927 0.936 0.934 0.919 
[0.005]*** [0.007]*** [0.004]*** [0.012]** 
Control-to-ownership ratio (Ratio) 0.352 0.339 0.342 0.360 
[0.005]*** [0.016]** [0.009]*** [0.007]*** 
Institutional investor ownership -0.465 -0.439 -0.487 -0.432 
[0.017]** [0.021]** [0.016]** [0.023]** 
Wedge x Institutional investor ownership -0.942 
[0.012]** 
Institutional blockholder ownership -0.510 -0.485 -0.516 -0.513 
[0.018]** [0.024]** [0.017]** [0.028]** 
Wedge x Institutional blockholder ownership -0.964 
[0.015]** 
Ratio x Institutional investor ownership -0.327 
[0.018]** 
Ratio x Institutional blockholder ownership -0.339 
                   [0.014]** 
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Table 8 
Institutional ownership and the effect of insider control-ownership divergence on external finance constraints 
(Continued) 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cash flow/assets -0.107 -0.121 -0.110 -0.114 -0.109 -0.117 -0.108 -0.114 
[0.026]** [0.011]** [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.027]** [0.014]** [0.020]** [0.019]** 
Cash dividend dummy -0.050 -0.055 -0.047 -0.046 -0.048 -0.053 -0.054 -0.049 
[0.081]* [0.042]** [0.121] [0.122] [0.072]* [0.039]** [0.046]** [0.126] 
Debt/assets 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.039 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.027 
[0.071]* [0.086]* [0.062]* [0.028]** [0.136] [0.144] [0.124] [0.143] 
Log assets -0.063 -0.051 -0.066 -0.062 -0.054 -0.068 -0.056 -0.050 
[0.039]** [0.072]* [0.034]** [0.038]** [0.070]* [0.032]** [0.067]* [0.073]* 
Industry sales growth 0.123 0.129 0.134 0.126 0.132 0.125 0.124 0.138 
[0.134] [0.124] [0.039]** [0.128] [0.054]* [0.151] [0.147] [0.036]** 
Firm sales growth -0.083 -0.086 -0.082 -0.074 -0.075 -0.081 -0.078 -0.077 
[0.032]** [0.030]** [0.061]* [0.066]* [0.067]* [0.037]** [0.035]** [0.063]* 
Analyst coverage -0.018 -0.016 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.014 -0.017 -0.015 
[0.029]** [0.030]** [0.073]* [0.030]** [0.060]* [0.056]* [0.029]** [0.071]* 
MKT -0.756 -0.760 -0.827 -0.792 -0.707 -0.660 -0.694 -0.657 
[0.063]* [0.089]* [0.031]** [0.062]* [0.088]* [0.123] [0.125] [0.118] 
SMB 1.223 1.272 1.211 1.322 1.149 1.313 1.190 1.291 
[0.159] [0.082]* [0.147] [0.038]** [0.147] [0.032]** [0.155] [0.074]* 
HML 1.301 1.137 1.097 1.091 1.306 1.207 1.254 1.248 
[0.031]** [0.085]* [0.159] [0.147] [0.028]** [0.077]* [0.029]** [0.053]* 
Number of observations 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 19,154 
Number of firms 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 4,518 
p-Value of J-test 0.253 0.252 0.218 0.257 0.223 0.219 0.251 0.217 
 
 
